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KASHMIR’S SECESSIONIST 
MOVEMENT RESURFACES
Ethnic Identity, Community 
Competition, and the State
Reeta Chowdhari Tremblay
Abstract
The May 2008 Jammu & Kashmir government’s decision to transfer 99 acres 
of land to a Hindu shrine reignited the Kashmiri nationalist movement. This es-
say argues that Kashmiri ethnonationalist aspirations remain entrenched among 
the Valley’s Muslim population and that electoral participation is no guarantee 
of attenuated ethnonationalist demands.
Keywords: Kashmir, secessionist movement, Amarnath, land transfer 
Until the Amarnath land controversy of 2008, many 
observers, including the Indian government itself, thought that aspirations 
for azadi (freedom) among Kashmir’s Muslim population were on the 
wane. This assessment was based on two phenomena—a decline in the lev-
els of violence in the contested state of Jammu & Kashmir and the in-
creased participation of Kashmiri Muslims in the official electoral political 
process. Yet, as the massive ethnonationalist protests resulting from the 
Amarnath land row demonstrated, this turned out to be a serious misread-
ing of evolving political trends and dynamics in the state. 
This article argues three points.1 First, Kashmiri ethnonationalist aspira-
tions remain alive and deeply entrenched among the Valley of Kashmir’s 
Reeta Chowdhari Tremblay is the Vice President (Academic) pro 
tempore and Professor of Political Science at Memorial University in St. John’s, Newfound-
land, Canada. She would like to thank Asian Survey’s anonymous readers for their helpful and 
insightful comments on an earlier draft of this paper. Email: <rtrembla@mun.ca>.
1. This essay concentrates exclusively on the internal dynamics of Kashmir’s secessionist/
nationalist movement while acknowledging that the Pakistan factor and the global jihadi
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Muslim population, irrespective of assertions to the contrary. Second, eth-
nonationalist leaders and groups are most successful in mobilizing senti-
ments for azadi when Kashmiri Muslims perceive that the state is no longer 
acting in their economic interests or sufficiently protecting their distinct 
religious identity. Third, the Kashmir Muslim population since the 1996 
election—the first since the 1989 secessionist movement—has discovered 
that it can pursue its short-term economic objectives by participating in 
the official state-sponsored electoral process while continuing to express 
its long-term demands for azadi outside the institutional political frame-
work. For example, Kashmiri Muslims may have participated in the No-
vember/December 2008 state assembly elections following the Amarnath 
land dispute in high numbers to have their daily needs for bijli (electricity), 
pani (water), and sadak (roads) addressed, and not in affirmation of Indian 
control over the Valley. This relatively high voter turnout in the Valley, in 
fact, occurred against the backdrop of massive demonstrations for the 
right of self-determination during the land dispute and an election boycott 
called by many ethnonationalist groups.
These dynamics appear to point to the Kashmiri Muslims’ strategic 
compartmentalization of their short-terms interests into daily issues of 
management and governance. Omar Abdullah, the new chief minister of 
Kashmir belonging to the National Conference (NC) and Congress coali-
tion government, seemed to share this assessment when he observed that 
the people in the Valley wanted to separate day-to-day issues from the 
issue of Kashmir’s constitutional status, thus largely explaining why such 
a large number had come out to exercise their franchise.2 While addressing 
the population’s everyday needs has emerged as a mantra of all major 
Kashmiri political parties contesting the elections, electoral participation 
appears to be no guarantee of attenuated ethnonationalist demands. Is-
sues of sovereignty and self-determination continue to simmer beneath 
the surface of constitutional politics in the state.
The following discussion is divided into four main parts. The first sec-
tion provides a historical background to the present situation in Jammu & 
Kashmir. It traces the Kashmir issue to the partition of India and the 1947 
Treaty of Accession, examining the asymmetrical federal arrangements 
devised by the Indian state to accommodate the distinct collective Kashmiri 
(holy Islamic) movement have, to some extent, played a role in the formation and continuation 
of Kashmir nationalism. For an analysis of these external factors, see Robert G. Wirsing, 
India, Pakistan, and the Kashmir Dispute: On Regional Conflict and Its Resolution (New York: 
St. Martin’s Press, 1998).
2. Daily Excelsior (Jammu), December 28, 2008, at <http://www.dailyexcelsior.com/>, ac-
cessed January 12, 2009.
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identity. It also discusses the subsequent steady erosion of these legal pro-
visions, which gave rise to the nationalist/secessionist movement in 1989.3 
The second section gives a detailed description of the rekindling of the 
mass-based ethnonationalist movement in the Valley following the govern-
ment’s decision to transfer a plot of government-owned land to a Hindu 
shrine board for the annual Amarnath yatra (pilgrimage) in 2008. The third 
section compares and contrasts the dynamics of the 1989 disturbances to 
those that emerged in 2008. Finally, the fourth section concludes by exam-
ining possible solutions to the “Kashmir problem” in light of the changing 
dynamics of the conflict witnessed during and after the 2008 Amarnath 
land row.
The Historical Background
The Indian state of Jammu & Kashmir (population 10.1 million in 2001) 
consists of three religiously and linguistically diverse regions: the Kashmir 
Valley (population 5.4 million), which has a largely homogeneously Mus-
lim population since the 1989 Hindu exodus; the Jammu region (popula-
tion 4.5 million, 67% Hindu, 27% Muslim, and 5% Sikh); and Ladakh 
(population 200,000, half  Buddhist, half  Muslim).4 
The roots of the present day conflict in Jammu & Kashmir can be traced 
directly to the Treaty of Accession signed by the maharaja of Kashmir on 
October 26, 1947. With the exit of the British from India earlier that year, 
the princely state of Kashmir, much like the other 560 princely states through-
out the Indian Subcontinent, was advised by the departing colonial power 
to join either of two new independent countries—India or Pakistan. Ini-
tially, Maharaja Hari Singh, the Hindu Dogra ruler of the majority Muslim 
princely state, hesitated to join India.5 Eight years earlier in 1939, the NC 
party had been launched against the maharaja in the Kashmir Valley under 
the leadership of Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah.6 The NC was a secular 
3. Important works on Kashmir include Sumantra Bose, The Challenge of Kashmir: De-
mocracy, Self-Determination, and a Just Peace (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1997); Sumit 
Ganguly, The Crisis in Kashmir: Portents of War, Hopes of Peace (Washington, D.C.: Wood-
row Wilson Center Press and Cambridge University Press, 1997); Victoria Schofield, Kashmir 
in Conflict: India, Pakistan, and the Unfinished War (London: I. B. Tauris, 2000); and Raju G. 
C. Thomas, ed., Perspectives on Kashmir: The Roots of Conflict in South Asia (Boulder, Colo.: 
Westview Press, 1992). 
4. Census of India, Office of the Registrar General and Census Commissioner, India, at 
<http://censusindia.gov.in/population_finder/State_Master.aspx?State_Code=01>, accessed 
July 25, 2009.
5. Dogras, a distinctive ethnic group in the Jammu region, are largely Hindus. They speak 
the Dogri language. 
6. For Abdullah’s role, see Khushwant Singh, Flames of Chinar: Abdullah Mohammad 
Sheikh (abridged and trans. from Abdullah’s Urdu biography titled Aatish-e-Chinar) (New 
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and socialist nationalist party whose goals closely resembled those of the 
Indian National Congress and whose impetus was the desire to improve 
the lot of poor Muslim peasants in Kashmir. Discrimination against Mus-
lims was pervasive and evident throughout the princely state. For example, 
the 1927 “state-subject ordinances” protected employment exclusively for 
citizens of the state, but chiefly benefited the Hindu minority in both the 
Valley and the Jammu region. Sheikh Abdullah succeeded in uniting both 
Hindus and Muslims in opposition to the autocratic Dogra rule by reviv-
ing Kashmiriyat, a composite Kashmiri identity irrespective of religion 
and a potentially salient historical symbol. Kashmiriyat was a secular eth-
nic concept expounded by the 14th-century Muslim ruler Zain-ul-Abdeen 
that had served to define the cordial relationship between the Valley’s 
Hindu and Muslim communities in the past. 
 The NC’s platform called for the construction of a “new Kashmir” in-
cluding a democratic constitutional framework with an extensive bill of 
rights and a socialist agenda with extensive land reforms. The NC also 
called for the people of Kashmir to exercise their fundamental rights “to 
live and act as free human beings, to make laws and fashion their political, 
social, and economic fabric.”7 Thus, a new political discourse was initiated 
through the reaffirmation of this synthetic Kashmiriyat identity and the 
articulation of a new socialistic ideological agenda. The NC received broad 
support from the Indian National Congress when it launched its “Quit 
Kashmir” movement against Dogra rule in 1946, including from Congress 
leader Jawaharlal Nehru, who was a Kashmiri Hindu. Thus, it was not 
surprising that, a year later, the maharaja was less than enthusiastic about 
joining India. Instead, he asked for an accord with both India and Paki-
stan, which the latter signed on August 15, 1947, as the Standstill Agree-
ment. This agreement requested each country to continue the existing 
arrangements that had prevailed between the state of Jammu & Kashmir 
and the outgoing British government “pending settlement of details and 
formal execution of [a] fresh agreement.”8
Events, however, soon forced the maharaja’s hand. In October, tribesmen 
from Pakistan’s northwestern regions invaded the princely state of Kashmir 
while, at the same time, the Poonch District on the state’s western border 
with Pakistan declared its independence from Dogra rule. Unable to defend 
Kashmir from this invasion, the maharaja requested military assistance 
Delhi: Viking Press, 1993). Also see Ian Copeland, “The Abdullah Factor: Kashmiri Muslims 
and the Crisis of 1947,” in The Political Inheritance of Pakistan, D. A. Low, ed. (New York: 
St. Martin’s Press, 1991). 
7. Mohan Krishen Teng, Ram Krishen Kaul Bhatt, and Santosh Kaul, Kashmir: Consti-
tutional History and Documents (Jammu: Light & Life Publishers, 1977), p. 178.
8. Ibid., p. 538.
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from the Indian central government. India, however, was adamant that it 
would not provide any military support to the princely state until and un-
less the maharaja formally acceded it to India. For this reason, Maharaja 
Hari Singh signed the Instrument of Accession on the morning of Octo-
ber 27, 1947.9 India’s governor-general, Lord Mountbatten, accepted the 
offer of accession under special circumstances and informed Maharaja Hari 
Singh that the question of accession would be placed before Kashmir’s pop-
ulation once the territory had been cleared of the tribal invaders. Nehru im-
mediately confirmed this conditional acceptance and, in a detailed statement 
to the Constituent Assembly of India, reasserted the ultimate right of the 
people of Kashmir, under the supervision of an impartial international tri-
bunal such as the U.N., to decide their future political association.10 
Two-thirds of the princely state of Kashmir was subsequently liberated 
from tribal invasion with the help of the Indian army and brought under 
Indian jurisdiction. The other third came under the control of Pakistan—an 
arrangement that has remained to this day with Azad (Free) Kashmir being 
administered by Pakistan. (The boundary, initially termed “the ceasefire 
line,” has been referred to by both sides as the “Line of Control” [LOC] 
since the Indo-Pakistan War of 1971.) The maharaja left the state to take 
up residence in Bombay after the conditional accession, and Sheikh Ab-
dullah was appointed head of an interim emergency administration, which 
was replaced shortly thereafter in 1948 by an interim popular government 
with the sheikh as prime minister. 
Asymmetric Federalism: Reconciling Formal 
and Informal Nationalisms
Accommodating a distinct Kashmiri identity was the Indian Constituent 
Assembly’s guiding principle in 1950 when it approved Jammu & Kashmir’s 
unique and asymmetric constitutional relationship with India through 
Article 370 of the Constitution. This constitutional provision created a 
special status for the state, unlike any other state in the Indian federation. 
9. There is a controversy about exactly when the Instrument of Accession was signed by 
the maharaja. Joseph E. Schwartzberg brought to the author’s attention in 1996 that the ma-
haraja signed the Instrument on October 27, 1947, which was nevertheless dated October 26. 
This argument is supported by Alastair Lamb, who makes the claim that Indian troops had 
entered Kashmir well before the Instrument of Accession was signed. See Alastair Lamb, 
Kashmir: A Disputed Legacy, 1846–1990 (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1992), pp 148–56. 
Prem Nath Bazaz, in his book Kashmir 1947: Rival Versions of History (Delhi: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 1996), takes on Lamb and presents an alternative history of the accession instrument. 
See particularly pp. 59–74.
10. Jawaharlal Nehru, Independence and After: A Collection of Speeches 1946–49 (New 
York: Day, 1950), p. 9.
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In addition, the provision reaffirmed the “state-subject requirements” 
whereby state employment and ownership of property were to remain the 
exclusive prerogatives of citizens of Jammu & Kashmir.
Article 370 restricted the central government’s powers solely to the areas 
of foreign affairs, defense, and communications, allowing the state govern-
ment full legislative powers in all other areas. These were termed “tempo-
rary provisions,” demonstrating the government of India’s commitment to 
the position that “an opportunity would be given to the people of the 
State to decide for themselves whether they will remain with the Republic 
or wish to go out of it.”11 A widespread belief  prevailed among the Indian 
leadership that the Kashmiri Muslim population would freely and will-
ingly accede to India when given the opportunity.12 Elections to the Jammu 
& Kashmir Constituent Assembly were held the following year.13 
In his opening speech to the Constituent Assembly on October 31, 1951, 
Sheikh Abdullah outlined the reasons for not seeking accession to Paki-
stan and pointed to the common traditions shared by the Indian and the 
Kashmiri populations in terms of their desire to pursue secular demo-
cratic and socialist political principles. However, he left the decision of ac-
cession to the Constituent Assembly. In 1952, the Delhi Agreement was 
signed between the leaders of Jammu & Kashmir and the Indian govern-
ment, further clarifying the provisions of Article 370. In particular, it rec-
ognized Urdu as the official language of the state and agreed to a special 
state flag. It also extended the provisions of the Constitution of India in 
regard to fundamental rights and emergency powers to Jammu & Kash-
mir. Incorporating the specific provisions for asymmetric federalism laid 
out in Article 370 and the Delhi Agreement, the Constitution of Jammu 
and Kashmir was proclaimed on January 26, 1957.14 The state is the only 
one of India’s states to have such a document. 
Through various constitutional categories, the Indian state simultane-
ously both embraced and denied its differences from Kashmiri society. 
11. P. L. Lakhanpal, Essential Documents and Notes on Kashmir Dispute (New Delhi: In-
ternational Books, 1965), p. 311. 
12. Jawaharlal Nehru confirmed this view in one of his letters to the state chief  ministers. 
See Letters to Chief Minister, vol. 1950–1952 (Delhi: Teen Murti House: A Project of the 
Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund, distributed by Oxford University Press, 1985), p. 245. 
13. On October 27, 1950, the General Council of the NC adopted a resolution asking the 
interim government of Jammu & Kashmir to convene a Constituent Assembly. This resolu-
tion expressed frustration with the inability of the United Nations to address the issue of 
Pakistani tribal invasion of the Valley in 1947 and the uncertain political future of the state. 
Accordingly, the Regent Karan Singh (who replaced Maharaja Hari Singh as the nominal 
head of the state) ordered the establishment of the Constituent Assembly. Once elected, it 
would also exercise the powers of a Legislative Assembly. 
14. Lakhanpal, Essential Documents and Notes on Kashmir Dispute, p. 247.
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Although India recognized the Kashmiri people’s distinct cultural identity 
in the form of Kashmiriyat, it also asserted that the similarities between 
Kashmir and the Indian state were based on their common secular, social-
ist, and democratic agendas. Interestingly, this has become the basis by 
which the secular Indian elite and the most popular Kashmiri nationalist 
group, the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), have come to 
define the Kashmiri “nation” and its relationship with India. All the while, 
however, Jammu’s Dogra population remained critical of India’s position 
on special status for the state of Jammu & Kashmir. In 1952, the Praja 
Parishad (Popular Association)—the Jammu-based Hindu party that is 
closely affiliated with Bhartiya Jan Sangh (Indian People’s Alliance)15 and 
its cultural parent Rashtriya Sewak Sangh (National Volunteers Organiza-
tion, RSS)—started a protest movement seeking the state’s complete ac-
cession to and full integration with India.16 
This had significant long-term implications and a dramatic short-term 
impact. Over the longer term, Jammu became labeled as “communal” and 
was marginalized by both the state and central Indian leadership. In the 
short run, the movement had a profound effect on Sheikh Abdullah, who 
began seriously considering the option of  independence for the state of 
Jammu & Kashmir. His concerns related to the fact that, in light of the 
overt expressions of Hindu chauvinism in Jammu, it would be difficult to 
convince the Valley’s population that their Muslim identity could be ef-
fectively protected within India. For this reason, the NC’s working com-
mittee adopted a resolution seeking complete independence for the state 
in 1953. Sheikh Abdullah was subsequently dismissed as prime minister 
and imprisoned in August of that year.17 He was released in 1964 at Nehru’s 
urging. 
15. The Bhartiya Jan Sangh, popularly known as Jan Sangh, was the parent party of the 
Bhartiya Janata Party (Indian People’s Party, BJP), founded in 1980. 
16. Navnita Chadha Behera, State, Identity, and Violence: Jammu, Kashmir, and Ladakh 
(New Delhi: Manohar, 2000), pp. 84–87.
17. The central government had become increasingly suspicious of Sheikh Abdullah, who 
was openly speaking with foreign correspondents about the independence option for the state. 
He also rejected central government offers to visit New Delhi for talks, leading to the suspi-
cion that he was no longer loyal to the central government and unwilling to implement the 
Delhi Agreement. Meanwhile, an internal rift within Abdullah’s cabinet had emerged. A ma-
jor faction, headed by Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed, sensing that Abdullah had lost the con-
fidence of the central government, began to question his leadership. Karan Singh advised 
Abdullah to dissolve the cabinet and reorganize it, which Abdullah refused to do. Despite the 
hesitancy of Karan Singh and Nehru, the Abdullah government was dismissed. Karan Singh 
asked Bakshi to form the new government, but Bakshi expressed his unwillingness to do so if  
Abdullah remained free to “propagate his views.” Subsequently, Abdullah was arrested. See 
Sayyid Mı¯r Qa¯sim, My Life and Times (Bombay: Allied Publishers, Ltd., 1992), pp. 65–68.
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Breakdown of the Initial Entente and the 1989 
Secessionist Movement
The 1952 Jammu agitation and Abdullah’s independentist response prompted 
the Indian state to begin integrating the state of Jammu & Kashmir into the 
Indian federation as a matter of deliberate policy. This brought about the 
gradual, but steady, disintegration of the innovative relationship that had 
been simultaneously forged on differences and similarities between the 
Indian state and the Kashmir “nation” only a few years earlier. Beginning 
with Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed’s government, which replaced Sheikh 
Abdullah’s, and ending with Mir Kasim’s government in 1975, a number 
of constitutional measures were adopted to consolidate the state within 
the Indian Union, both politically and financially. Except for the “state-
subject regulations,” which were left intact, the earlier asymmetrical feder-
alism was replaced by uniform principles of constitutional and political 
governance.18
In 1954, under Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed, the Constituent Assembly 
of Jammu & Kashmir ratified the state's accession to India. In conformity 
with the state’s 1957 Constitution, the original Article 370 was amended 
several times by the state legislature and approved by the Indian Parlia-
ment. Their goal was to make most of the provisions of the Indian Con-
stitution applicable to Jammu & Kashmir, including Articles 356 and 357, 
which allowed the central government to impose President’s Rule.
In 1975, as a result of an accord signed by Sheikh Abdullah (who once 
again headed the state government) and Indian Prime Minister Indira 
Gandhi, Jammu & Kashmir was made a constituent unit of India. Abdul-
lah had not abandoned his views on Kashmir’s autonomy and its distinct 
status. But in light of the changed South Asian geopolitical position in the 
early 1970s, when Pakistan lost its eastern wing and Bangladesh was liber-
ated with India’s assistance, Abdullah was not in a strong bargaining posi-
tion. Moreover, the Simla Agreement signed on July 3, 1972, between India 
and Pakistan made all previous pronouncements on Kashmir superseded 
by the agreement, and converted the ceasefire line into the LOC. This ac-
tion recognized the partition of Jammu & Kashmir into Indian-occupied 
and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. Through this accord, the Indian Parlia-
ment reaffirmed its right to legislate on any matter concerning Jammu & 
Kashmir, as it did with other Indian states. In short, the Indian state im-
posed itself  on the Kashmiri “nation” through legal integrationist mea-
sures by gradually, but ineluctably, abrogating the legal and political space 
in which the Kashmiri community had previously come to define itself.
18. Ganguly, The Crisis in Kashmir, p. 51; Bose, The Challenge of Kashmir, pp. 33–35; 
Behera, State, Identity, and Violence, pp. 107–115. 
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It is during this period, when the breakdown of the asymmetrical federal 
framework occurred, that the movement for Kashmiri autonomy began to 
surface in the Valley. All these events—the arrest of Sheikh Abdullah in 
1953, the installation of successive centrally approved state governments, 
the incremental integration of Jammu & Kashmir into the Indian Union, 
and the erosion of its special constitutional status—generated contradic-
tions between the meanings and structures associated with formal and in-
formal nationalisms.19 To explain, as Jammu & Kashmir was brought into 
the Indian Union, the formal nationalism was no longer able to relate it-
self  to the daily experiences of the Kashmiri Muslim population. 
During the integrationist period, the state government used the comple-
mentary strategies of repressing democratic opposition and distributing 
widespread patronage to quench informal nationalism. In Kashmir Valley, 
one-party rule has been exercised by the NC, renamed the Indian National 
Congress in 1965.20 Any effort on the part of a faction from within its 
ranks to create an opposition has been traditionally thwarted by the party 
in power.21 The only vocal opposition, the Plebiscite Front (formed in 1955 
by Abdullah’s close associate Mirza Beg to assert the distinct identity of 
the state and its right to self-determination), was cheated out of the 1969 
local government elections. The Plebiscite Front was declared an unlawful 
association in advance of the 1972 elections.
The association between the success of patronage politics and the hege-
mony of the ruling party in the Valley was easily discernible in the first 
three state assembly elections, which took place in 1957, 1962, and 1967. 
The NC and its breakaway faction, the Indian National Congress Party, 
were both supported by the central government and won a majority of the 
seats in the Valley uncontested. For example, the ruling NC won all 40 seats 
19. Formal nationalism is state-sponsored nationalism whereby a state, through its legal 
and constitutional apparatus, constructs, amends, or names an identity and mobilizes the 
population toward its goals. Informal nationalism or popular nationalism emerges from be-
low. It expresses itself  in various daily social, cultural, or religious practices. For example, 
events such as the Friday noon prayers and dedar (showing) of the holy relic (a hair from 
Prophet Mohammed’s beard) at the Hazratbal Mosque have been much more effective in 
creating national consciousness or the distinct identity of the Kashmiri Muslims than the 
state-generated symbols and practice. 
20. The Indian National Congress did not have any links to the mainstream Congress 
Party in India. 
21. For example, the Democratic National Conference was created by a breakaway faction 
of the NC in 1957. This new party did contest the 1962 elections but was unable to capture a 
single seat (vote rigging is commonly acknowledged as the main reason for this). Soon after, 
the party merged once again with its parent organization. Similarly, all those members of the 
NC who had not joined the Indian National Congress in 1965 rejoined the ruling party in 
1972 because they had not found electoral success. 
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in 1957; it won all but two seats in 1962. The Indian National Congress, the 
breakaway NC faction headed by Ghulam Mohammed Sadiq, who be-
came Kashmir’s prime minister in 1964 and then its first chief  minister in 
1965, won 33 seats in 1967.22 
It was only during the subsequent election of 1972 that the two opposi-
tion parties, the pro-Pakistan Jamaat-i-Islami (“Islamic Bloc”) and Ab-
dullah’s Plebiscite Front, were able to enter the arena and mobilize the 
Valley’s population toward the goals, respectively, of an Islamic society or 
an independent Kashmir.23 For the first time, the Valley witnessed a large 
voter turnout (66%) in these elections, beginning a trend toward higher voter 
participation that was to last until the start of the political insurgency in 
1989. 
Several other expressions of the public’s discontent in the Valley were 
evident during this period of integration into Indian federalism. One such 
event was the reported disappearance of the Holy Relic of Prophet Mo-
hammed—the Moe-i-Muqaddas (the Prophet’s beard hair)—from Haz-
ratbal Shrine, which spurred violence and demonstrations that spilled 
across the Valley in December 1963. It was believed that the relic, which 
was kept in a small tube of glass locked in a wooden cupboard and ritu-
ally exhibited only 10 times a year, had originally been sent to Kashmir by 
Mughal Emperor Aurangzeb (1658–1707). Its disappearance brought the 
Valley to a standstill. All businesses, trade, and government services were 
shut down; curfew was imposed throughout the Valley after the police and 
army were unable to control the emotional outbursts of the population.
 On January 4, 1964, the relic was found with the help of Indian intelli-
gence agencies, but the return of the Moe-i-Muqaddas failed to pacify the 
populace because of widespread rumors that it was not authentic. Calm 
was restored only after a special verification ceremony was held to estab-
lish the relic’s authenticity. Mirwaiz Mohammed Farooq, the chief  Mus-
lim religious leader in Kashmir, authenticated the holy relic, assisted by 
the newly founded Awami (meaning People) Action Committee. The latter 
would later become a constituting group of the separatist alliance known 
22. There were two major reasons for Sadiq’s and the Indian National Congress’s success: 
(1) the massive corruption and patronage politics associated with Bakshi and the NC party; 
(2) Bakshi, who headed the NC party, was perceived to be involved with the disappearance of 
the holy relic from the Hazratbal Shrine, in that he had borrowed the relic to show it to his 
dying mother. There is no official substantiation of this, but rampant rumors existed in the 
Valley to this effect. 
23. For a historical perspective on Jammu & Kashmir elections, see Reeta Chowdhari 
Tremblay, “Elections in Kashmir: An Exercise in Pragmatism,” in Paul Wallace and Ram-
ashray Roy, eds., Indian Politics and the 1998 Elections: Regionalism, Hindutva, and State Poli-
tics (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1999), pp. 309–39.
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as the Hurriyat Conference and a principal actor in the secessionist move-
ment of 1989, seeking the state’s integration with Pakistan.24 A key conve-
nor of Hurriyat was Mirwaiz Omar Farooq, son of Mohammed Farooq, 
who inherited the mirwaiz mantle after his father was assassinated in 1990. 
Sheikh Abdullah reintroduced the issues of identity and autonomy into 
the state’s political discourse in 1975 upon reentering the political arena 
after his latest release from prison.25 He declared that the people of Kashmir 
would not hesitate to secede from India unless the latter recognized the 
state’s distinctness and reversed its integrationist constitutional amendments. 
In 1981, the year before Abdullah’s death, the NC passed a resolution—
“Toward New Kashmir Autonomy”—under his leadership pledging non-
cooperation with all those national laws that were detrimental to the 
autonomy of the state. Abdullah’s demands amounted to a call to a return 
to pre-1953 asymmetrical federalism and autonomy within the Indian Union. 
After his death, the crystallization and maturation of  the secessionist/
irredentist forces within the Valley derived equally from two factors. One 
was the politically integrative activities of Gandhi’s government, into which 
the post-Sheikh state leadership became inadvertently drawn. Equally im-
portant was the breakdown of the political and economic frameworks 
within which patronage politics had flourished in the state. 
Ethnonationalist Insurgency and Politics 
from 1989 Onward
The year 1989 saw the demand for autonomy converted into calls for azadi 
led by two sets of forces—one secessionist and the other irredentist—and 
supported probably by most of the Valley’s Muslim population.26 The leading 
secessionist actor in the insurgency was the JKLF, which sought an inde-
pendent and united Kashmir with the restoration of  the pre-1947 bound-
aries. The main irredentist forces were the Hizbul-Mujahideen (Party of 
24. Ganguly, The Crisis in Kashmir, pp. 49–50. The All Parties Hurriyat Conference, an 
alliance of 26 political, social, and religious organizations in the Kashmir Valley, was formed 
in 1993 with two specific goals: to achieve self-determination for the people of Jammu & 
Kashmir and to create a society based on Islamic principles.
25. In 1964, with Nehru’s intervention, Abdullah was released from imprisonment after 11 
years. Nehru asked him to be his emissary to Pakistan and convince President Ayub Khan to 
engage in a dialogue with India about Kashmir. Soon after, Nehru died, and Abdullah’s reas-
sertion of Kashmir’s autonomy led to his arrest in 1965. He was in detention until 1968. In 
1971 he was exiled from Kashmir for 18 months.
26. For a detailed discussion on the 1989 movement, see Bose, The Challenge in Kashmir, 
pp. 55–104; Ganguly, The Crisis in Kashmir, pp. 92–130; Schofield, Kashmir in Conflict, pp. 
136–188; Reeta Chowdhari Tremblay, “Nation, Identity, and the Intervening Role of the 
State: A Study of the Secessionist Movement in Kashmir,” Pacific Affairs 69:4 (Winter 1996–97), 
pp. 471–98.
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Holy Warriors), Jamaat-i-Islaami, and the Awami Action party, all seek-
ing the unification of the state with Pakistan. With military assistance for 
azadi groups being supplied by Pakistan and the training of militants in 
neighboring Azad Kashmir, a full-fledged ethnonationalist insurgency en-
veloped the Valley during the year 1989. Although the catalytic event had 
been the rigging of the 1987 state assembly elections by the unpopular 
NC-Congress coalition, the azadi cause became the rallying cry for those 
opposing the state government and India.27 Daily demonstrations accom-
panied by violence against supporters of the government, members of the 
ruling party, and alleged government informants (mostly the Kashmir 
Hindus) caused a complete breakdown of law and order and paralysis of 
the administrative and governmental machinery of the state.28 The Valley’s 
small Hindu minority population, almost in its entirety, fled the Valley.29 
In the first year of the insurgency, militant groups combined violent 
methods against anyone opposed to their cause with a shrewd strategy of 
neutralizing state-sponsored nationalism in favor of a fully articulated in-
formal nationalism to which they gave exclusive public prominence. First, 
a new public events calendar was formulated in which events relating to 
Islam, Islamic societies, the history of Muslims in Kashmir, Pakistan’s 
27. Sheikh Abdullah’s death in 1982 provided an opportunity for Indira Gandhi and her 
Congress Party to intervene directly in Kashmir politics. Farooq Abdullah, chosen earlier by 
his father as his heir, assumed the chief ministership and began to rally the anti-Gandhi opposi-
tion forces. In October 1983, Farooq hosted a three-day opposition conclave in Srinagar involv-
ing 59 state leaders from 17 different Indian regional parties. In 1984, the Central Congress 
Party succeeded in creating a rift within Farooq’s NC, and a large faction withdrew their sup-
port of the government. G. M. Shah, Farooq’s brother-in-law, replaced Farooq. Shah’s govern-
ment lacked popular support. For the first time in the Valley, there were communal riots. A 
breakdown of law and order led to the imposition of Governor’s Rule in 1986. In 1987, the 
Farooq-Rajiv Gandhi accord brought Farooq back into power. The United Muslim Front, 
which included dissident Muslim groups—both irredentist and secessionist—contested the 
elections in the Valley with the slogan, “A Contest between Islam and Secularism.” However, 
there had been a massive rigging of the elections. Although the Muslim Front received 32% of 
the popular vote, it managed to win only four seats. Because the Front was widely popular, the 
Valley’s population was outraged at the election results.  For details, see Reeta Chowdhari 
Tremblay, “Responses to the Parliamentary & Assembly Elections in Kashmir Valley, Ladakh 
and the Jammu Region and the State-societal Relations,” in Ramashray Roy and Paul Wallace, 
eds., India’s 1999 Elections and Politics in India (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2003), p. 409.
28. Rajesh Kadian, The Kashmir Tangle: Issues and Options (New Delhi: Vision Books, 
1992), pp. 9–37.
29. In the author’s interviews conducted in 1996 and 1998 with Kashmir Hindu refugees 
in camps in Jammu and surrounding areas, several of them pointed out that Jagmohan, gov-
ernor of Kashmir (1984–89), had encouraged their departure from the Valley with a promise 
to bring them back to their home in the near future. They also confirmed stories of arbitrary 
killing of Hindus in the Valley. For Jagmohan’s version of the story, see Jagmohan, My Frozen 
Turbulence Years (New Delhi: Allied Publishers, 1992). 
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independence, etc. became official days of celebration. Conversely, days 
commemorating events associated with India such as Republic Day and 
Independence Day were denounced and marked by a complete shutdown 
of the Valley. October 24, the day marking the Treaty of Accession, be-
came termed the “Day of Occupation.” Second, the militant groups called 
for all individuals in the Valley associated with the ruling NC party to 
publicly announce their resignation from the party in newspapers, under 
the heading “Declaration of Disassociation.” Fearing retaliation, two-
thirds of party members withdrew their membership. 
Third, India had for years tried to make a case for Kashmir’s accession 
to India by pointing to the citizenry’s record of strong participation in 
local, state, and national elections. But the militants ensured that voters 
stayed away from the 1989 parliamentary elections in Kashmir in droves, 
by threatening physical harm to anyone voting and by destroying several 
polling stations through arson. As a result, voter turnout in three parlia-
mentary constituencies in the Valley barely reached 4%.30 By ensuring only 
negligible Kashmiri participation in 1989 Lok Sabha (People’s House, the 
lower house of India’s Parliament) elections, the secessionist/nationalist 
groups felt they had accomplished their objective of delegitimizing Indian 
claims that the Kashmiri population supported the Indian state. The groups 
also succeeded in disassociating formal from informal nationalism. 
During the first few years of the ethnonationalist insurgency, the mili-
tant violence committed by both indigenous and imported groups, such as 
the Pakistan-based Harkat-ul-Ansar (Movement of Helpers), led to recip-
rocal state repression as India responded with an increased military pres-
ence in the Valley and around the LOC. During the early 1990s, more than 
a half  million Indian military and paramilitary personnel were deployed 
in the Valley.31 In the course of counterinsurgency operations, the Indian 
security forces were accused by the local population of arbitrary deten-
tions, torture, arson, and rape. India became increasingly subject to inter-
national censure for human rights violations by groups such as Amnesty 
International and Human Rights Watch, and also to Pakistani lobbying at 
the international level against the Indian role in Kashmir. As a result, 
India took measures to better monitor the behavior of its own security 
forces during the mid-1990s and allowed international civil society organi-
zations to enter the state to review the human rights situation. 
At the same time, the Indian government began reviving the democratic 
political process by conducting both legislative assembly and parliamentary 
30. Ganguly, The Crisis in Kashmir, p. 152; Tremblay, “Elections in Kashmir,” p. 328.
31. Iffat Malik, Kashmir: Ethnic Conflict, International Dispute (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford 
University Press, 2002), p. 304. 
AS4906_02_Tremblay.indd   936 12/9/09   3:09 PM
REETA CHOWDHARI TREMBLAY 937
elections. The Indian attempt to revive the normal political process in 
Kashmir was aided by Pakistani actions of exclusively supporting, both 
financially and militarily, the jihadi groups in the Valley.32 This marginal-
ized the highly popular indigenous groups such as the JKLF, which be-
came operationally less effective than the foreign groups, partially because 
of foreign assistance to the latter. Continued violence by the jihadi groups, 
both local and Pakistan-based, and their harsh impact on the daily lives 
of the Kashmiri population backfired and gave a window of opportunity 
to the Indian government to hold elections to the state legislative assembly 
in 1996. Although the elections were boycotted by all separatist groups 
and voter turnout was only about 40%, India was subsequently gradually 
able to reactivate normal administrative and political governance after 
these elections. As a result of these efforts, the state has had three legisla-
tive assembly elections, in 1996, 2002, and 2008.33 
India has continued its dual strategy of aggressively trying to eliminate 
the militants while trying to engage moderate separatist groups in dia-
logue. India’s counterinsurgency measures during the past seven years 
have brought fatalities in the state to low levels in comparison to the 1990s, 
indicating a diminishing armed insurgency. According to a study by the 
Institute for Conflict Management, the total number of deaths declined 
from 4,507 in 2001 to 777 in 2007. More significantly, the number of civilian 
deaths declined from 1,067 in 2001 to 164 in 2007.34 As recently as May 
2008, India was aggressively trying to convince and cajole moderate fac-
tions of the Hurriyat Conference to participate in the upcoming October 
elections. Local Kashmiri newspapers reported that Hurriyat leaders such 
as Mirwaiz Omar and Abdul Ghani Bhat were beginning to soften their 
stance and trying to convert their hardcore supporters to start thinking 
about participating in the elections.35 This response by Hurriyat Conference 
leaders was certainly also related to the new global political environment 
after the events of 9/11 and the subsequent “war on terror” that strength-
ened India’s hand in implementing its strategy of counterinsurgency and 
political engagement of the militants in the Valley. But recent events—namely, 
32. There is an important distinction between the foreign militants who seek jihad––a fight 
against the West and its values and the spreading of global Islam––and the local nationalist 
groups who seek azadi for the state of Jammu and Kashmir.
33. Tremblay, “Elections in Kashmir,” pp. 309–39.
34. The Institute for Conflict Management, “Jammu and Kashmir Assessment—Year 
2009,” at <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/jandk/index.html>, accessed 
July 25, 2009.
35. Riyaz Masroor, “Renewed Kashmiri Tinderbox,” Himal South Asian 21:9 (September 
2008), at <http://www.himalmag.com/Renewed-Kashmiri-tinderbox_nw1047.html>, accessed 
April 16, 2009. 
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the Amarnath land dispute—changed all of this, as we will see, and once 
again inflamed demands for azadi in Kashmir in 2008.
The 2008 Amarnath Shrine Controversy 
and Renewed Demands for Azadi
Small, seemingly innocuous decisions can sometimes have enormous un-
intended political consequences. In May 2008, the Jammu & Kashmir gov-
ernment announced that it would transfer 99 acres of land in the Kashmir 
region to the governing board of a Hindu shrine. That decision, and the 
ensuing chain of events, reinvigorated and fueled the Kashmiri secessionist/
nationalist movement as, for the first time in almost 18 years, the Valley 
witnessed recurrent large-scale demonstrations. A newly mobilized younger 
population, with few or no memories of the 1989 protests, resurrected a 
chorus of earlier slogans such as: “This Kashmir Is Ours; We Will Decide Its 
Future”; “Asia’s Peace Lies in a Kashmir Solution”; “Demolish the Bloody 
Line; Unite the Two Parts of Kashmir”; “Aai Zalimo Aai Jabiro, Kashmir 
Hamara Chod Do” (Vacate Our Kashmir, O Oppressors); “Ham Maang 
Ke Lein Ge: Azadi” (We Will Demand, We Will Get It: Freedom); “Galli 
Galli Main Shoar Hai; Azadi Ka Zor Hai” (There Is This Noise in Every 
Street; It Is the Force of Freedom).36 
All this was reminiscent of the events of the late 1980s that culminated 
in the Kashmir Valley’s mass-supported opposition to India, the break-
down of the state’s administrative and governance framework, and the 
handing over of the Valley to Indian security forces to deal with an esca-
lating ethnonationalist insurgency. India had appeared to pull itself  out of 
that crisis over the past decade through successful counterinsurgency op-
erations and a reactivation of the normal democratic political process, but 
the Amarnath land episode from May-September 2008 eroded much of 
this progress and breathed new life into the Valley’s demands for azadi. 
The popular reaction demonstrated the depth of alienation and resentment 
seething under the garb of supposed reemerging “normalcy” in the Valley. 
The Land Transfer Decision: Mobilization 
and Counter-mobilization
The Amarnath pilgrimage known as the yatra, which is usually held in 
early July, is an annual Hindu religious tradition to pay homage to Lord 
Shiva. The Amarnath caves, at an altitude of 4,000 meters, are located 140 
36. Arundhati Roy, “Land and Freedom,” Guardian (London), August 22, 2008, at <http://
www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/aug/22/kashmir.india>, accessed July 25, 2009; Athar Par-
vaiz, “No Violence, Just Slogans on Their Lips Now,” Kashmir Times, August 2008, at <http://
www.kashmirtimes.com/>, accessed July 25, 2009. 
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kilometers from Srinagar, the summer capital of the state of Jammu & 
Kashmir and by far the largest city of the Kashmir Valley. A three-meter-
high ice Shiva lingam (idol of Shiva) in the caves is an important object of 
worship, the viewing of which is considered by pilgrims to be equivalent 
with a meeting with Lord Shiva himself. The cave was discovered in the 
18th century and the Amarnath yatra has played a significant role in the 
expression of Kashmiriyat, which entails the peaceful co-existence of Hin-
dus and Muslims in the region. The yatra has been essential to the realiza-
tion of Kashmiriyat over the past 150 years.37 The government of Jammu 
& Kashmir has been responsible for the security, transportation, and hous-
ing needs of pilgrims en route to the caves, and the local Muslim popula-
tion has traditionally looked after their arrangements, especially for food 
and shelter. 
From the 1989 secessionist/nationalist movement to the present, it was 
essential to both the Indian government and the local Kashmiri people 
that the pilgrimage take place without disruption. The yatra provided 
economic benefits to the local population; for the Indian government, it 
symbolized the carrying on of  business as usual against the backdrop of 
potential political discontent. In addition, the yatra has been important 
for locally based militant groups such as the JKLF to give credibility to 
their claims that their nationalist goals are purely political, not religious. 
However, the pilgrims going on this yatra have been targeted by jihadi 
groups such as the Lashkar-e-Toiba (Army of  the Pure), halting the 
journey during 1991–96. Despite the heavy presence of  Indian security 
forces, 22 pilgrims were massacred on their way to the caves in the year 
2000. In more recent years, the number of  pilgrims has risen dramati-
cally, largely as a result of  vastly improved security arrangements and 
facilities. Compared to 12,000 pilgrims participating in 1989, the number 
rose to 400,000 in 2007, and in 2008, more than half  a million pilgrims 
had visited the site by August.38 In order to accommodate these vastly in-
creased numbers, the previously two-week pilgrimage period was extended 
to two months. 
The Shri Amarnathji Shrine Board (SASB) was constituted in 2000 by 
an act of the Jammu & Kashmir state legislature on the recommendation 
37. On the concept of Kashmiriyat, see Riyaz Punjabi, “Kashmir: The Bruised Identity,” 
in Thomas, ed., Perspectives on Kashmir, pp. 136–37. For one of the best histories of regional 
identity and the fluctuating basis of Kashmiri identity in relation to class and ideology, see 
Chitralekha Zutshi, Languages of Belonging: Islam, Regional Identity, and the Making of 
Kashmir (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004). 
38. Arundhati Roy, “Land and Freedom: Civil Society Appeals PM for Peaceful Resolu-
tion in J&K Crisis,” Kashmir Times, August 15, 2008, at <http://www.kashmirtimes.com/>, 
accessed July 25, 2009.
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of the Nitish Sengupta Committee, which had been appointed by India’s 
Rajya Sabha (Parliament’s Council of State) in 1996 to prevent similar 
tragedies after more than 250 pilgrims died in a snowstorm.39 The SASB 
consisted of eight members including the governor of the state as its ex-
officio chair. The SASB’s duties included overseeing the smooth operation 
of the ritual aspects of the worship, the management and administration 
of the shrine and its funds, and the general convenience of the pilgrims. 
Regarding the latter, the SASB Act assigned three particular responsibili-
ties to the board: the construction of buildings to accommodate worship-
ers, the construction of sanitary facilities, and the improvement of means 
of communication.
In October 2004, the SASB sent a project report to Jammu & Kashmir’s 
forest department requesting an assignment of 455 acres of land for seven 
halting places for the pilgrims. This was granted in May 2005, but the state 
government overruled its department, arguing that this decision contra-
vened provisions of the Jammu & Kashmir Forest Conservation Act of 
1997. That decision itself  was later reversed by the state’s high court, 
whereupon the SASB requested that the state government regularize the 
use of the government land by formally transferring a few plots to the 
board. Three years later, in May 2008, the state cabinet passed a proposal 
diverting 99 acres of forest land to the SASB for Rs 2.5 crores ($538,213).
This decision was immediately met with widespread opposition in the 
Valley. The government’s coalition partner, the PDP (People’s Democratic 
Party), threatened to resign from the government unless Chief Minister 
Ghulam Nabi Azad, of the Congress Party, withdrew the order. Setting 
aside their differences, the separatist groups in the Valley—including the 
two major factions of the Hurriyat Conference, led by Syed Ali Shah Gee-
lani and Mirwaiz Omar Farooq, respectively—created a civil society group 
called the Action Committee Against Land Transfer (ACALT, popularly 
known as the Kashmir Action Committee), which included journalists, 
human rights advocacy groups, trade unions, teachers, traders, writers, 
and industrialists to generate a unified response to the government’s deci-
sion. It was also agreed that the coordination committee of the ACALT—
consisting of Geelani and Mirwaiz Farooq; Yasin Malik of the JKLF; 
and representatives from the Kashmir Chamber of  Commerce and In-
dustry, Fruit Growers Association, Employees Joint Action Committee, 
the Kashmir Bar Association, and the House Boat Owners and Hoteliers 
39. On the SASB , see Office of the Divisional Commissioner, Jammu & Kashmir Govern-
ment, Amarnath Ji Yatra [Amarnath pilgrimage], at <http://kashmirdivision.nic.in/about/
services/amryatra.htm>, accessed July 25, 2009. Also see SASB’s website, <http://www.
shriamarnathjishrine.com/the-holy-shrine.html>, accessed July 25, 2009.
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Associations—would be solely responsible for organizing protests and 
demonstrations. 
The first mass protests in the Valley against the land transfer decision oc-
curred on June 23, resulting in the security forces killing one person and in-
juring 40 others. In response to the first call by the ACALT coordination 
committee, 60,000 people gathered in the city of Srinagar on June 27.40 Pro-
tests, reportedly on a scale unparalleled in the Valley’s recent political his-
tory, swept through the Valley over the next eight days, resulting in the death 
of two more persons and 200 injured. This mass anger was directed against 
the state government and also the central Indian state. Apprehensions about 
the apparently shifting demographic balance in the state, which supposedly 
threatened Muslim identity, added fuel to the fire caused by the Amarnath 
land transfer controversy. For example, many local newspapers such as 
Greater Kashmir, the Daily Etalaat (Daily Bulletin), Rising Kashmir, Srina-
gar Times, and the Daily Aftab (Daily Sun) carried reports and presented 
data from the Indian census documenting a consistent decline of the Mus-
lim population from 72.4% in 1941, to 68.3% in 1961 and 66.9% in 2001.41 
These massive protests and strong pressure from the central Congress 
leadership prompted Chief Minister Azad to withdraw the government’s 
decision on the Amarnath land transfer on July 1, 2008. The Jammu & 
Kashmir government’s decision to cancel the transfer to the SASB coin-
cided with the end of S. K. Sinha’s term as governor of the state. Sinha 
had been personally involved in the creation of the board and its proactive 
agenda. N. N. Vohra replaced Sinha as government on June 25, and one 
of his first acts was to try to resolve the ongoing political crisis. In his ca-
pacity as chairman of the SASB, Vohra sent a letter to the chief  minister 
withdrawing the board’s earlier request for forest land for the pilgrims, 
with the intent of resolving the crisis by formally transferring the manage-
ment of the pilgrimage back to the state government. Azad, in reversing 
the land order, said the state government would look after the logistics of 
the pilgrimage including security, lodging, and temporary housing on the 
way to the caves and that the SASB would look after the religious rituals 
associated with the yatra. 
The Valley’s Muslim population was quick to claim victory, while Jam-
mu’s Hindus saw the reversal on the decision as a capitulation to Kashmiri 
40. Daily Aftab (Urdu ed.; Srinagar, Kashmir) June 28, 2008, at <http://www.dailyaftab.
com/>, accessed August 13, 2008. 
41. Arjimand Hussain Talib, “Kashmir’s Myth of Discrimination,” Kashmir News Ser-
vice, August 12, 2008, at <http://www.knskashmir.com/articles/Myth%20of%20Discriminat.
htm>; “Changing Demography in Conflict Zones,” Daily Rising Kashmir, June 26, 2008, at 
<http://www.risingkashmir.com/>; and Praveen Swami, “Kashmir’s Politics of Hate,” Kashmir 
Herald, August 13, 2008, at <http://www.kashmirherald.com/main.php?t=OP&st=D&no=385>. 
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Muslim fundamentalism. In response, they launched a violent resistance 
movement under the leadership of the Amarnath Sangharsh Samiti (Re-
sistance Committee), which closely resembled the ACALT in terms of its 
constituent members. Never had the Hindu-majority Jammu region of the 
state witnessed such unity among its population in opposing a government 
decision. A call for agitation was given by Hindu nationalist groups, and 
the general population participated in the protests overwhelmingly and vi-
olently. In the name of both Indian and Jammu nationalisms, protestors 
destroyed government property and even attacked army troops. Curfew 
after curfew was imposed in the city of Jammu and other major cities, but 
with little effect. Jammu’s population—both men and women—defied the 
curfews, beating thalis (stainless steel plates) and shouting slogans in praise 
of Lord Shiva such as Bhum Bhum Bhole (Hail Shiva). Much like the 
Kashmiris in the Valley, Jammu’s Hindus boycotted the official ceremo-
nies for India’s Independence Day as acts of protest. The Janamashtmai 
procession, celebrating the birth of Lord Krishna on August 22, also saw 
a novel feature—inclusion of a Shiva lingam and a replica of the Amar nath 
shrine—demonstrating the emerging centrality of the issue to the region’s 
Hindu population. Educational institutions, government offices, hotels, 
and shops remained closed for nearly two months. 
The political strife and controversy were ratcheted up when Jammu’s 
protest strategy was expanded to include an economic blockade of the 
Valley. On July 2, Hindu nationalist organizations such as the BJP; Vishwa 
Hindu Parishad (World Hindu Council, VHP); and Bajrang Dal (Hanu-
man Group) blocked the Jammu-Srinagar highway—the only land route 
connecting the Valley to the outside world—thus effectively preventing the 
transport of all goods into and out of the Valley. This blockade lasted a 
full week. On the export side, the shipping of fruit from the Valley to the 
rest of India was halted, giving the Kashmiri separatists the idea to hold a 
“march to Muzaffarabad” in Pakistani-controlled Azad Kashmir to pro-
vide an alternative outside market to Kashmiri fruit growers. On August 
11, 50,000 to 250,000 Kashmiri protesters attempted to cross the border 
but were stopped by the police. On the import side, the Valley experienced 
a sudden shortage of petrol, medicine, and other essential goods, but the 
Indian government was slow to respond. It took six days for the army to 
be called in to force open the road. Meanwhile, several national BJP lead-
ers including Lal Krishna Advani and Arun Jaitley lent their support to 
Jammu’s resistance movement.
By August 15, the Kashmiri Action Committee had reduced its objec-
tives to four distinct demands: (1) the right to self-determination; (2) the 
opening up of all trade routes with Azad Kashmir; (3) demilitarization, by 
replacing Indian forces with U.N. troops and revoking the Armed Forces 
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Special Powers Act and the Disturbed Areas Act; and (4) the release of 
Kashmiri prisoners in Indian jails.42 Several hundred thousand people in 
the Valley participated in each of five agitation marches in mid-August to 
protest against the economic blockade and appeal to the international 
community, particularly the U.N., to intervene in the Kashmir issue. By 
the third week of August, more than 20 protesters in the Valley had been 
killed by Indian security forces. 
Unlike the violent Jammu demonstrations, the Kashmiri protests, though 
massive in numbers, were largely peaceful. All major leaders of the Val-
ley’s secessionist groups repeatedly emphasized the need to conduct peace-
ful protests. They realized that the 1989 movement had lost the support of 
Kashmir’s masses largely because of the escalating violence emanating 
from both the militant groups and the security forces. In addition, despite 
internal differences among the separatist groups regarding their goals (an 
independent state of Jammu & Kashmir, versus affiliation with Pakistan), 
the ACALT coordination committee decided to present a unanimous pub-
lic agenda of azadi, amorphously defined, to the outside world. For exam-
ple, when the Hurriyat hardline leader Syed Ali Shah Geelani called during 
a public rally on August 18, 2008, for a merger with Pakistan, he was imme-
diately made to withdraw this comment by the other separatist leaders.43 
During a press conference only hours after his speech, he apologized and 
stated that the movement was larger than his own personal political pref-
erences for Kashmir’s constitutional status.
Underlying this public posturing of maintaining a united front, there 
nonetheless remained deep ideological differences within the separatist 
camp, including those between Geelani, Mirwaiz Omar Farooq, and 
JKLF leader Yasin Malik. While Geelani advocated an Islamic Kashmiri 
state merged with Pakistan, Malik’s separatist politics have always stood 
for an independent but secular and united Jammu & Kashmir. Farooq, on 
the other hand, adopted a more middle-of-the-road and pragmatic position 
(to engage with India as well as with pro-independence groups such as the 
42. “Protests to Continue, Open Trade to Muzaffarabad: Mirwaiz,” Kashmir Times, Au-
gust 16, 2008, <http://www.kashmirtimes.com/>; “Geelani Asks Pro-India Leaders to Resign 
or Face Social Boycott,” Daily Excelsior, August 14, 2008; “Open Road to Muzaffarabad: 
Mirwaiz,” ibid., August 16, 2008; “Stronger Geelani’s New Slogan: Ham Pakistani hain, Paki-
stan Hamara Hai” (We are Pakistani, Pakistan is ours), ibid., August 19, 2008, at <http://www.
dailyexcelsior.com/>, accessed July 25, 2009.
43. “Hawk Geelani Says He’s ‘Sole’ Azadi Leader, Then Apologizes,” Indian Express, August 
19, 2008, at <http://www.indianexpress.com/news/hawk-geelani-says-hes-sole-azadi-leader-
then-apologises/350505/0>, accessed July 25, 2009; and “Differences Crop up amidst Unity 
Efforts,” Kashmir Times, August 19, 2009, at <http://www.kashmirtimes.com/>, accessed July 
25, 2009.
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JKLF), while a majority of the members of his Awami Action Committee 
party tend to support Kashmir’s association with Pakistan. 
The two-month long agitation in Jammu in 2008 was called off  on Au-
gust 31 after an agreement was reached between a governmental panel and 
a conglomerate of Hindu groups. A joint declaration announced that the 
SASB would be allowed temporary use of the forest land during the Amar-
nath yatra and that a reconstituted shrine board would be responsible for 
conducting the pilgrimage. However, title to the land would remain un-
changed in government hands. It was also agreed that the shops and other 
structures on the controversial land would remain the responsibility of the 
permanent residents of Jammu & Kashmir. While there was jubilation in 
the Jammu region over this decision, the agreement was perceived by Mus-
lims as capitulation, not compromise, sparking a fresh round of protests 
in the Valley. Kashmiri separatists and the PDP, in fact, rejected the ac-
cord, whereas the NC welcomed it as “a very good sign.”
To preempt a more demonstrable reaction in the Valley, the government 
imposed a regional curfew lasting almost a week, put the secessionist lead-
ers under house arrest, banned newspapers, and shut down cable television. 
Fortunately for the government, the month-long observance of Ramadan 
had a dampening effect on protest activity in the Valley, even though it 
witnessed two major shutdowns and demonstrations in September. Tak-
ing advantage of this lull in protests, the central Indian government 
worked quickly on two fronts to further diffuse the situation. It coordinated 
with Pakistan to open a trade route across the LOC to Azad Kashmir, 
thereby responding to one of the main demands of the ACALT coordina-
tion committee. And after broad consultation with various constituencies 
in the state, the Indian Election Commission recommended that state leg-
islative assembly elections be held in Jammu & Kashmir in November. 
Voter turnout in the Valley reached an impressive 55% despite the call for 
a boycott by Kashmiri ethnonationalist groups.44
Although a further escalation of the crisis was averted through the for-
mation of a new civilian government in Jammu & Kashmir (and the de-
ployment of more paramilitary forces), the message emerging from the 
elections was clear. The NC won the largest number of seats (28), followed 
by the PDP (21), Congress Party (17), and BJP (11). The government was 
formed by the NC with the support of Congress. The vote was largely cast 
in favor of more-efficient governance and meeting the daily needs of the 
people, not necessarily against azadi. As one voter in the Valley percep-
tively remarked, “We want azadi, and at the same time we also want azadi 
44. The Election Commission of India, at <http://ceojammukashmir.nic.in/jkla08.html>, 
accessed April 16, 2009.
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from erratic power supply and bad roads. We are voting because we need 
to have our representatives who will address our local issues.”45 Thus, the 
steps taken by the Indian government to control the ethnonationalist im-
pulses of Kashmir’s Muslims appear to be stopgap measures at best, in the 
light of continuing desires for some form of political azadi—whether in-
creased political autonomy, independence, or unification with Pakistan. 
The factors that have given rise to demands for azadi remain deeply em-
bedded within the Valley’s Muslim population. The Amarnath land con-
troversy demonstrated how an apparently insignificant event can reactivate 
these simmering discontents against India and in favor of secession. 
Differences between the 1989 Insurgency 
and the 2008 Movement
For all their similarities, there are several important differences between 
the recent disturbances and those of 1989–90. These differences not only 
affect possible solutions to the “Kashmir problem” but also our academic 
understanding of its contemporary dynamics. The Kashmir problem has, 
in fact, evolved in many important ways since 1989, as evidenced through 
an analysis of the 2008 mobilization caused (at least proximately) by the 
Amarnath land controversy. 
First, the 1989 separatist movement was largely political, as opposed 
to religious. The great majority of  the Valley’s population appeared to 
support the essentially secular secessionist cause within the framework 
of  the traditionally composite Kashmiri identity known as Kashmiriyat. 
In contrast, the recent demands for Kashmiri freedom from Indian rule 
appear to be increasingly situated within the communal theme of protect-
ing an exclusive Muslim Kashmiri identity. The migration of virtually the 
entire Hindu community out of the Valley during the 1990s has created a 
pronounced demographic transformation in the Kashmir region. The Val-
ley is now characterized by a homogeneous population and a monolithic 
culture. As a result, the post-1989 generation of Kashimiris in the Valley is 
increasingly deprived of the secular traditions and daily secular practices 
of the past. This has led to the conflating of political goals (separating 
from India to protect a distinct Kashmir history and identity) with Islamic 
goals (protecting the Muslim character of the Valley for fear of religious-
ethnic subjugation). The land transfer has been interpreted by the Valley’s 
Muslim population as a first step to possible government-sponsored Hindu 
45. Showkat A. Motta, “Large Turnout in Kashmir Polls No Approval of Indian Rule,” 
One World South Asia, January 9, 2009, <http://southasia.oneworld.net/todaysheadlines/large-
turnout-in-kashmir-polls-no-endorsement-of-indian-rule/>, accessed April 16, 2009.
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domination of the region, which could eventually alter Kashmir’s Muslim-
majority status.
 Despite their deep Islamic undertones, the recent protests have none-
theless kept the public face of a nonsectarian political movement; the un-
derlying dynamics may be more disturbing. Azadi, freedom from the 
Indian state, has remained the unifying theme among the irredentists, who 
seek a formal association with Pakistan, as well as the secessionists, who 
want an independent and united Jammu & Kashmir. This difference, while 
less evident publicly during the Amarnath land controversy, remains en-
trenched within the political dynamics between Kashmir’s different Mus-
lim ethnonationalist factions and groups. 
Second, the recent disturbances engulfed the entire state of Jammu & 
Kashmir, whereas the 1989 secessionist/nationalist movement was largely 
confined to the Kashmir Valley and, in an attenuated way, the Muslim-
majority towns in Jammu, Doda, Rajouri, and Poonch. Thus, a sharp com-
munal and regional polarization has developed, pitting Jammu’s Hindus 
against the Valley’s Muslims. In 1953, when the notion of special status for 
the state of Jammu & Kashmir received widespread support in both regions, 
Jammu’s Hindu nationalist groups remained only a small minority decrying 
this special status.46 In contrast, they succeeded in 2008 in mobilizing Jam-
mu’s population to support the complete restoration of government land 
to the SASB for the Amarnath yatra. These Hindu nationalist groups, in-
cluding the BJP and Sangh Parivar (Family of Associations),47 framed the 
recent Jammu agitation in terms of Indian nationalism and Jammu’s right-
ful place in the larger state of Jammu & Kashmir. 
By contrast, the Valley’s Muslim population interpreted the land transfer 
as a civil occupation threatening its demographic dominance and diluting 
its religious/cultural identity. The SASB was seen as a foreign institution im-
posed on the state by the Indian authorities, whose activities were per-
ceived as a Hindu invasion of the Valley. Jammu & Kashmir’s deepening 
communal polarization was further evidenced in the November/December 
2008 state assembly elections. For the first time ever, Jammu’s Hindu pop-
ulation appeared to prefer the BJP over the Congress Party. In the Valley, 
voters continued to support either the NC or the PDP—two parties that 
supported Valley residents’ demands against the Amarnath land decision 
and advocated meeting the citizenry’s daily needs. In essence, the more 
46. For a detailed discussion, see Reeta Chowdhari Tremblay, “Jammu: Autonomy within 
an Autonomous Kashmir?” in Thomas, ed., Perspectives on Kashmir, pp. 153–67.
47. Sangh Parivar refers to a family of all organizations associated with the cause of 
Hindu nationalism. The RSS volunteers organized this group in order to unify the Hindu 
nationalist movement. 
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Jammu raises the slogan of protecting Indian nationalism and Jammu’s 
rightful place in the state, the more hardened Kashmiri Muslims become 
in their demand for azadi. Thus, the communalization of the Hindu posi-
tion serves only to elicit a parallel communal response from the Valley. The 
result is a continued sharpening and crystallization of religious identities in 
the two regions, making the Kashmir problem increasingly intractable. 
Third, Kashmir’s secessionist leaders seemed to have climbed a steep 
learning curve in their increasingly judicious use of violence and intimida-
tion in comparison to the past: violence was integral to the movement in 
1989. It was directed primarily against the security forces but also against 
the civilian population. The violence then entailed killing so-called intelli-
gence agents of India (mostly Kashmiri Hindus), intimidating and killing 
local party workers, threatening to kill those who participated in elections, 
and extorting money from ordinary people. 
In contrast, the 2008 demonstrations were largely peaceful. Their leaders 
urged the masses to remain peaceful and concentrate on their political de-
mand for azadi. They understood that any retaliation by the Indian forces 
would only strengthen their own cause and that the civilian population, if  
it became the target of secessionist violence, would abandon the move-
ment as it did in the mid-1990s. Thus, it is no accident that while Jammu’s 
demonstrations were intensely violent, those occurring in the Valley re-
mained peaceful. Nevertheless, the security forces killed more people in the 
Valley than in Jammu, giving further impetus to Kashmiri demands for 
azadi. Unlike the situation that eventually developed in the 1990s, the peace-
ful nature of the demonstrations in 2008 allowed the indigenous national-
ist groups to dominate the political discourse during the protests instead 
of the jihadi groups supported by Pakistan. Religious undertones aside, 
the groups were also able appropriate azadi demands as their own, not 
connected to the agenda of any external actors. 
Toward a Solution
The recent Amarnath yatra land dispute has shown how deeply embedded 
identity issues remain in the political life of the Valley and now, perhaps, 
in the entire state of Jammu & Kashmir. Although in early 2008 it may 
have appeared that the azadi movement had few local supporters in the 
Valley, it is clear that this was not the case and that sentiments for azadi 
are very much alive. It took an administrative decision to transfer a small 
piece of land to a Hindu shrine board to mobilize the Valley’s population 
once again to challenge the Indian state. A major crisis was averted, at 
least for the time being, through the combination of a cautious and well-
conceived strategy by the Indian government, a newly restrained approach 
to violence by the secessionist groups, and good timing in terms of the 
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month of fasting during Ramadan. As we saw, the Indian government 
persuaded Jammu’s Hindus to accept the compromise of temporary usage 
of the contested land rather than legal ownership of it. The government 
also calmed down the Valley by imposing a week-long curfew and putting 
ethnonationalist leaders under house arrest, while meeting a key seces-
sionist demand by working with Pakistan to open the trade route across 
the LOC.48 Furthermore, the Election Commission of India, after consul-
tations with all political parties and with government officials, gave the 
green light to holding state legislative assembly elections in Jammu & Kash-
mir in November. 
Although the secessionist groups urged Kashmiris to stay away from 
the polls, voter turnout of just over 55% in the Valley and 61.5% in the 
state as a whole was impressive.49 The two main Kashmiri Muslim parties, 
the NC and PDP, clearly identified their intent to respond to people’s daily 
needs. For the latter party, this was a continuation of its campaign mani-
festo of 2002, “Issues of the Common People,” promising a corruption-
free government, unconditional dialogue with militants, disbanding the 
counterinsurgency Special Operations Group (SOG) accused of human 
rights violations, and providing a “healing touch” to those affected by mil-
itancy. Voter turnout in the 2002 elections was 45%, and the PDP had won 
16 seats in majority of the separatist support-based constituencies in the 
Kashmir Valley. Although the NC won 18, the Congress and the PDP 
agreed to a Common Minimum Program (CMP), shifting from government 
formation to the issue of governance (the Congress Party had emerged as 
the strongest party in the Jammu region, and thus a solid partner for the 
PDP-Congress coalition). 
The NC followed suit in the 2008 elections, producing even better re-
sults as turnout improved, even in constituencies with a massive separatist 
support base. For example, turnout in 2008 was more than respectable in 
Anantnag, Kokernag, Bijbehera, and Kulgam at 38%, 57%, 58%, and 60%, 
respectively, as compared with 7%, 15%, 17%, and 24%, respectively, in 
2002. The NC and PDP split the seats in the Valley, 19 and 20, respec-
tively. The Congress Party, associated with the Amarnath land dispute and 
generally viewed as pro-India, elected only three members in the Valley. 
The results in the Jammu region were quite different as supporters of 
the Jammu agitation won 14 seats, 11 for the BJP (its best showing ever), 
48. It should be noted that opening up trade routes through the LOC was actually foreseen 
as part of an ongoing mutual agenda of confidence-building measures between India and Paki-
stan, but the unrest in Jammu & Kashmir certainly contributed to its quicker formalization.
49. All information on 2008 elections is from the Election Commission of India website, 
at <http://ceojammukashmir.nic.in/jkla08.html>, accessed April 16, 2009.
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and three for the Jammu and Kashmir National Panthers Party.50 The BJP 
also increased its popular vote from 8.5% in 2002 to 19% in 2008. The 
election results echoed a regional divide: the Kashmiris voting for gover-
nance issues and the residents of Jammu responding to the government’s 
reversal of the Amarnath land transfer decision and their perceived dis-
crimination within the state. The formation of a new civilian government 
may have no more than postponed an escalated Kashmir crisis. In fact, it 
would be naïve to interpret Kashmiri Muslims’ enthusiastic participation 
in the elections as indicating a mitigation of their ethnonationalist senti-
ments. Any future event similar to the Amarnath land row that Kashmiri 
Muslims perceive as being a threat to their identity or economic security 
will likely trigger a similar ethnonationalist mobilization. 
Until and unless long-term solutions can be found to the demands of 
Kashmir’s nationalists, they are likely to continue to express themselves 
periodically, and with mounting intensity, through mass protests.51 Al-
though India has made great strides in controlling the external sources 
that have historically exacerbated the Kashmir problem, through engaging 
Pakistan to resolve the two countries’ many differences, New Delhi now 
needs to rethink its overall Kashmir strategy and find lasting internal solu-
tions to the problem. At a minimum, there are two things that will have to 
be done. First, the principle of asymmetric federalism needs to be reaf-
firmed. There is no doubt that the abandonment of asymmetric federalism 
based on the principle of accommodating differences has been the major 
source of the present dilemma and the likely spawning ground of future 
crises. The best India can hope for, and what it must do, is to try to ensure 
50. The Jammu and Kashmir National Panthers Party is based exclusively in the Jammu 
region. The party largely seeks benefits for the scheduled castes and the refugees in the state. 
Its support base is very limited. Although its standing improved in the elections from one seat 
won in 1996 to four in 2002 and three in 2008, it remains a very marginal party.
51. Once again the Valley has been witnessing ongoing sets of massive protests against the 
state in its handling of the Shopian rape-murder case. Two women, 22 and 19, were raped and 
murdered in the town of Shopian in south Kashmir, 51 kilometers from Srinagar, on May 29, 
2009. There is a general belief  in the Valley that security forces were involved in the rape and 
murder. In June, in order to put a stop to almost daily public protests, the state administration 
put the leaders of several separatist groups under house arrest. Amid public outcry, Jammu & 
Kashmir Chief Minister Omar Abdullah appointed a judicial enquiry panel, which submitted 
its interim report on June 20, recommending that the role of security forces be further inves-
tigated. On the basis of this report, several police officers were suspended for their negligence 
in handling the case. In August, the state government handed over the case to the Central 
Bureau of Investigation (CBI). Meanwhile, in his Independence Day address, Omar Abdullah 
apologized to the people of Kashmir and assured the public that his government would not 
tolerate human rights violations by the security forces. The situation remains volatile, and the 
pendulum, any day, can swing in favor of demands for azadi. See Amitab Mattoo, “Kashmir 
after Shopian,” Economic and Political Weekly 44:28 (July 1–17, 2009), pp. 39–43.
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that demands for azadi are converted back into demands for autonomy 
within India. Within this context, a constitutional dialogue must be initi-
ated with all political actors including the secessionist and nationalist 
groups within the Valley, affirming the principles of asymmetric federal-
ism that have worked in the past. 
Second, as recent events have shown, Jammu is also now at the crux of 
resolving the Kashmir issue. The united front that Jammu Hindus pre-
sented in their recalcitrant response to the Amarnath land decision should 
be seen as a major cause of concern for the Indian state. As mentioned 
earlier, it is almost axiomatic that demands for azadi in the Valley become 
more ardent as Jammu residents appeal more insistently to Indian nation-
alism, Hindu sectarianism, and a history of being discriminated against 
within the state. The only lasting solution one can visualize to remedy this 
explosive disequilibrium is to create autonomous regions of governance 
within Jammu & Kashmir—a solution proposed by many since the early 
1950s—while concurrently offering the state more autonomy within the 
Indian Union.52 Because the state is multilingual and multiethnic, auton-
omy for its three distinct regions could help respond to the demands of 
the various “communities” within the state. This two-level autonomy—the 
autonomy of the state of Jammu & Kashmir granted constitutionally by 
India and the internal autonomy of its three regions—is an attractive so-
lution to break the current impasse exacerbated by a very proactive and 
hardened Hindu population in Jammu.53 In other words, until the recent 
land dispute erupted, the Indian government had to deal fundamentally 
with only the Valley’s Muslim population and could count upon the sup-
port of Jammu’s Hindus to endorse its Kashmir policies. The summer of 
2008 changed this political environment and shifted the “Kashmir crisis” 
to a more complex ground where regional polarization within the state 
will have to be dealt with, along with the Valley’s azadi demands. Unless 
this is done through negotiation with the various actors involved, the fu-
ture does not bode well for the state of Jammu & Kashmir. 
52. For examples of proposals for internal autonomy within Jammu & Kashmir, see Balraj 
Puri, Jammu and Kashmir: Regional Autonomy (a Report) (Jammu: Jay Kay Book House, 
1999); and Behera, State, Identity, and Violence, pp. 277–304.
53. As early as 1948, Balraj Puri advocated an internal regional autonomy solution for the 
state of Jammu & Kashmir. Despite endorsement over the decades of the principle of devolution 
of power to the three regions by several commissions and two government regional autonomy 
committees, major political parties such as the NC, Congress, and PDP have remained silent on 
this issue. These proposals do not have any support in the Valley and have been largely perceived 
by Kashmiri Muslims as reflecting communal demands of Jammu’s Hindus. There is also a fear 
that devolution would lead to the division of the state on communal lines: Muslim-dominated 
and Hindu-dominated regions. For details, see Behera, State, Identity, and Violence, pp. 256–302; 
and Tremblay, “Jammu: Autonomy within an Autonomous Kashmir?” pp. 157–59.
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